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Credit Default Swaps and the Financial Crisis 
I. Introduction 
 The financial crisis that struck in early 2007 shook the US economy and that of the 
world.  In the run-up to the crisis, financial markets bore witness to rapid innovation and the 
increasing prevalence of financial instruments that had hitherto been used relatively infrequently.  
One such example is credit default swaps (CDS).  One the first CDS contracts was negotiated in 
the mid-1990s.  Since then, the CDS market has grown enormously in size and organizations, 
such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), have provided frameworks 
for contract standardization (Stulz, 2010).   
 Credit default swaps (CDS) act like an insurance contract.  In the simplest case, the buyer 
of CDS pays a premium to the seller in return for protection against a credit event—usually a 
default—of a company, which is referred to as the “name” or the “reference entity.”  In response 
to a credit event, the seller of protection is obligated to make the buyer whole.  In this respect a 
CDS should transfer risk to those most willing to bear it.  However, there are competing accounts 
as to their contribution to and role in the recent crisis.  While many have vilified them for alleged 
market distortions, others assert that CDS should not introduce additional risk because they 
essentially transfer existing risk from one party to another (Wallison, 2008). 
 In this paper, I try to further gauge the multifaceted and evolving role CDS played in the 
recent financial crisis.  In the next section, I will further explore credit default swaps and the 
growth of the CDS market.  In Section III, I look at potential counterparty risk and resulting 
systemic risk that this instrument threatened, and consider a case study of American International 
Group (AIG).  In Section IV, I examine the repercussions of the empty creditor problem when 
creditors over-insure the debt they hold and will explore the bankruptcy of General Motors 
(GM).  Section V describes how exposure to the subprime mortgage and asset-backed securities 
markets was expanded by way of synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDO).  Finally, in 
Section VI, I conclude with an assessment of credit default swaps in the run-up to and during the 
crisis, asserting that while having beneficial qualities, they effectively exacerbated the crisis.  
More rigorous regulation is required to prevent the introduction of additional risk into the 
economy.   
II. Credit Default Swaps: Growth and Evolution of the CDS Market 
 Credit default swaps are attractive investment tools because they enable market 
participants to transfer risk to those parties that are best equipped and most willing to bear it.  
Holders of a company’s bond, for example, can use CDS as a hedging mechanism by purchasing 
protection for that entity.  The buyer of CDS is made whole in case of default via one of two 
means, as illustrated in Figure 1 below—physical settlement or cash settlement.  Under physical 
settlement, the protection buyer delivers the debt security to the seller of protection in exchange 
for its par value.  Cash settlement, the more popular method, entails the protection seller 
delivering to the buyer the difference between the par and recovery values of the security.    
Figure 1: CDS Cash Flows 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley 
 
Nonetheless, CDS have built-in leverage, which makes it possible for investors to take on riskier 
positions than they might otherwise.  For example, during the crisis, financial institutions chose 
to make and hold loans they likely would not otherwise have originated, namely subprime 
mortgages (Stulz, 2010).  They also took advantage of the lower capital requirements that came 
with holding CDS and opted to purchase senior tranches of asset-backed securities.    
 Buying CDS protection confers the same economic benefit as shorting debt.  However, 
the process is much more feasible and more liquid with CDS.  An important aspect of the CDS 
market is that an investor can choose to hold CDS protection without owning the protected 
security.  This is referred to as a naked position in CDS.  Therefore, both hedgers and 
speculators, have the ability to incorporate their opinions regarding credit risk into the market. 
 Credit default swaps are traded over-the-counter (OTC) and mainly between dealers.  
Thus, only limited data is available.  Organizations such as The Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) do have publicly available data, including statistics on outstanding notional 
CDS amounts, but historical data from even 18 months ago is difficult to obtain.  I rely on CDS 
market data available through the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and ISDA. 
Figure 2: Total Credit Default Swap Notional Amounts Outstanding 
 
Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. 
 
From Figure 2 we see that the notional amounts outstanding of CDS increased exponentially in 
the run-up to the financial crisis.  In 2001, the total notional amount outstanding was just shy of 
$920 billion.  In just four years it had increased to $17.1 trillion and peaked at around $62 trillion 






























decrease to the 2009 level of $30.4 trillion is the direct result of the crisis, when some CDS 
contracts were triggered, others matured, and fears of counterparty risk, which I discuss in the 
next section, made them less attractive.   
 The growth in the CDS market served as an impetus for further innovation and 
differentiation among the contracts.  For example, a single-name CDS insures against the default 
risk of a single firm.  A multi-name CDS is a contract that provides protection against the default 
of many firms or forms of debt, such as a pool of subprime residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS).   
Figure 3:  Amounts Outstanding of OTC CDS (by type) 
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements 
 
Figure 3 above shows the changes in the CDS market since 2004, when single-name instruments 
accounted for 80 percent of all CDS contracts.  By 2007, they composed only 56 percent of the 
market.  This shows that not only were the notional amounts outstanding increasing, but also that 
CDS contracts were becoming increasingly complex. 
This is related to the growth of CDS written referencing subprime RMBS.  An investor 
holding a tranche of a RMBS or CDO can buy CDS protection against it.  However, CDS 
functions differently in this case.  When one asset in the underlying asset pool defaults, the CDS 
is triggered to compensate for any reduction in payments to the tranche’s holder.  Even after 






























pool’s assets until maturity.  The process for taking positions on the subprime market was 
facilitated by the introduction of the ABX indices in 2006.  These indices allowed investors to 
take views on the subprime market without owning the mortgages.  Investors were also able to 
obtain more exposure to subprime mortgages than there were such mortgages (Stulz, 2010).   
III. Counterparty and Systemic Risks 
 Dealers wanted to meet the high demand for CDS, but also strove to hedge their 
exposure.  They utilized “daisy chains” in entering their credit default swap contracts, wherein 
they hedged protection sold with equivalent protection purchased from another dealer or 
insurance company, which may do the same.  Thus, they would act as intermediaries between the 
ultimate buyer and seller of protection (Wallison, 2008).  The proper functioning of the daisy 
chain depends on each counterparty fulfilling its contractual obligations.   
For the most part, counterparty risk was not a large threat because protection sellers 
posted collateral on a mark-to-market basis.  So, any drop in value of an asset would be covered 
by the collateral posted by the protection seller.  Interestingly enough, the amount of collateral 
posted as a percentage of notional CDS outstanding decreased in the run-up to the crisis, as 
captured in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Posted Collateral as Percentage of CDS Notional Amount Outstanding 






Source: ISDA Margin Survey, 2010 
 
This may simply be indicative of the optimistic attitude toward the economy at that time.  
However, collateral in circulation is a key measure of the total amount of collateral used to 
mitigate the credit risk of OTC derivatives (ISDA, 2010), and seeing it drop from 26.91 percent 
of CDS notional amount outstanding in 2003 to just 3.42 percent in 2007 hints at the risk of there 
being insufficient ability to fulfill contractual obligations in the event of an economic downturn.   
Counterparty risk did exist, then, in the event that the ultimate seller of protection failed 
to post an adequate amount of capital.  This could potentially impact the entire daisy chain.  If 
the ultimate seller of protection had written a substantial number of contracts, the counterparty 
risk can easily transform into systemic risk.  This was the case for AIG and its subsidiary, 
American International Group Financial Products (AIGFP). 
III.1 AIG Case Study 
 Financial institutions have certain capital requirements that they must abide by.  Since 
financial institutions had lower capital requirements if they held CDS, especially CDS insuring 
their subprime investments, demand for CDS grew quickly.  AIG met a significant portion of this 
demand.  Credit default swaps were not regulated like insurance contracts are—a regulatory 
oversight on monolines—so AIG sold swaps on $72 billion worth of CDOs to counterparties 
without holding the reserves necessary to cover potential losses (SIGTARP, 2009).   
 Essentially, AIG had too much exposure to the subprime market.  Unlike other financial 
institutions that would often hedge the protection they sold by buying equivalent protection from 
a different entity, AIG sold credit derivatives without hedging.  Furthermore, AIG was overly 
optimistic about the subprime mortgage market and held subprime CDO tranches.  When the 
CDO tranches were downgraded, it was not long until AIG was as well. 
 The CDS that AIGFP sold provided that AIG would post collateral if either it or the 
referenced CDOs were downgraded.  Beginning in 2007, AIG began experiencing a significant 
drain on its finances, when the company began to post increasing amounts of collateral to 
counterparties that had purchased CDS because of the precipitous drop in market value of the 
named CDOs.  On September 15, 2008, the rating agencies downgraded AIG and bankruptcy 
loomed because the financial giant was unlikely to meet additional calls on collateral payments 
resulting from the downgrade.  Table 2 below captures the upward trend in AIG’s collateral 
postings on portfolios it had written protection for.     
Table 2: AIG Collateral Postings (in millions of dollars) 
 Collateral posting during quarter ending 
Collateral Posting by Portfolio December 31, 2007 March 31, 2008 June 30, 2008 September 30, 2008 
Foreign Regulatory Capital - 212 319 443 
Multi-sector CDO 2,718 7,590 13,241 31,469 
Corporate 161 368 259 902 
Total Collateral Postings 2,879 8,170 13,819 32,814 
Source: SIGTARP 
 
This table shows that the financial strain on AIG jumped from a collateral posting of $2.9 billion 
in December 2007 to a $32.8 billion posting in September 2008.  It being the case that AIG is a 
global organization conducting business in over 130 countries and ranking as the largest life 
insurer and second largest property/casualty insurer in the US (SIGTARP, 2009), its failure 
presented systemic risk beyond the breakdown of the CDS daisy chains.  So, on September 16, 
2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) was authorized to lend up to $85 billion 
to AIG to prevent its bankruptcy. 
 FRBNY determined it critical to address AIG’s CDS portfolios to prevent further drain 
on its liquidity.  So, on November 10, 2008, FRBNY created the special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
Maiden Lane III to purchase CDOs underlying the CDS contracts.  Maiden Lane III paid AIG’s 
CDS counterparties fair market value of $27.1 billion for the CDOs.  This amount, in addition to 
the $35 billion AIG had posted in collateral payments, meant that AIG’s counterparties ended up 
receiving par value for their CDOs.   
 AIG ran into trouble because its portfolio of subprime mortgage CDOs was losing value 
and led to its downgrade and requirement to post additional collateral.  However, the thing that 
nearly drove the financial giant into bankruptcy was its contractual obligation to post collateral in 
the event of its own downgrade.  This contractual provision acted as a positive feedback loop, 
wherein one downgrade predisposed the corporation for another downgrade because of higher 
collateral requirements.  FRBNY realized that it had to assume liability for the CDS portfolio of 
AIGFP in order to prevent AIG’s bankruptcy.  Since then, FRBNY has unwound significant 
portions of AIG’s CDS, as shown in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 Changes to Value of AIGFP’s CDS Portfolio (in millions of dollars) 
 December 31, 2008 March 31, 2009 June 30, 2009 September 30, 2009 
Total $302,201 $258,356 $231,066 $205,959 
Percentage Decrease since 2008 15% 24% 32% 
Source: SIGTARP 
 
IV. Empty Creditor Problem 
 Since credit default swaps allow for naked buying, there exists the possibility that the 
overall notional amount outstanding for CDS can be greater than the sum of the face values of 
the assets they reference.  Furthermore, investors may choose to actually hold both CDS and the 
asset that it insures as a means of hedging their position.  Bolton and Oehmke find, however, that 
in equilibrium, investors tend to purchase more protection than they need to fully hedge their 
investment.  This gives rise to a unique situation known as the empty creditor problem.   
 Empty creditors are holders of both debt and CDS who no longer have an interest in the 
efficient continuation of the debtor, and who may push the debtor into inefficient bankruptcy or 
liquidation (Bolton and Oehmke, 2010).  This situation alters the debtor-creditor relationship, 
especially in the event of financial distress.  If a lender stands to make more money from a 
debtor’s default, which would trigger CDS, than the lender would receive as a result of 
renegotiating debt, which would not trigger CDS, then renegotiation may become impossible.  
Essentially, the debtor would have to compensate the creditor up to his level of credit protection 
in order for the latter to agree to a restructuring.  Thus, CDS protection can make creditors 
tougher negotiators in out-of-court restructurings, even going so far as to prevent renegotiations 
completely.   
 A company may attempt to restructure its debt for either liquidity reasons or strategic 
reasons (Bolton and Oehmke, 2010).  An attempt to renegotiate debt for liquidity reasons occurs 
when the firm does not have the capital required to pay its debt.  A strategic renegotiation, on the 
other hand, is characterized by a firm having sufficient capital to make whole its debtors but 
deciding that it would be advantageous to try to restructure its debt and retain whatever money 
creditors forego by agreeing to the process.  Renegotiating debt is a costly process.  Pursuing 
restructuring for strategic reasons is therefore inefficient because the debtor is capable of making 
whole its creditors (Bolton and Oehmke, 2010).  When creditors hold enough credit protection, 
they may disincentivize a firm from pursuing strategic restructuring.  This is the case because 
these creditors would be worse off if they agreed to a restructuring; they stand to gain more from 
the company defaulting.  Thus, the company will not pursue this route because the CDS holders 
would rather force it into bankruptcy than forego profits.  Therefore, CDS can stave off this 
inefficient process and be welfare-enhancing.     
 Furthermore, CDS can add value to a company’s assets by acting as a commitment 
device for borrowers to make whole its debtors, especially since any attempts to strategically 
restructure would be blocked.  As a result, investors are more likely to purchase the company’s 
debt and therefore increase the overall investment in that company.  While this is a beneficial 
aspect to holding CDS, creditors’ propensity to over-insure results in the negative empty creditor 
problem.  For instance, even when a company has good reason to restructure, i.e., liquidity 
reasons, the empty creditors may, nonetheless, force it into bankruptcy in order to profit.  This is 
what happened to General Motors during the financial crisis. 
IV.1 General Motors and the Empty Creditor Problem 
 The precursor to General Motors’s financial crisis woes was Standard & Poor’s 
downgrading the company on May 5, 2005 to below investment grade.  As with other 
automobile companies, GM’s positive beta value indicated that when the economy took a major 
negative shock as a result of a deteriorating housing market, GM would also be adversely 
affected.  On November 19, 2008, GM unsuccessfully appealed to both the Treasury and 
Congress for a financial rescue.  Chairman Rick Wagoner claimed that failure by GM would 
endanger the US auto industry: “The societal costs would be catastrophic — three million jobs 
lost within the first year, U.S. personal income reduced by $150 billion and a government tax 
loss of more than $156 billion over three years.”1 
In December 2008, the Bush administration gave GM a $13.4 billion bridge loan to keep 
the company afloat.  This was followed-up on March 30, 2009, when the Obama administration 
gave the company 60 days to create a plan to survive.  Trying to persevere, in April 2009, GM 
pared its American workforce, however its CEO acknowledged that bankruptcy was a growing 
possibility.  GM’s circumstances did not improve and following its stock price falling to 75 cents 
on May 29, 2009, it filed for bankruptcy just three days later.  GM’s CDS spreads, the premium  
payment protection buyers pay to protection sellers, captured this information. 
Figure 4: General Motors Credit Default Swap Spreads 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
                                                 
1  Herszenhorn, David M., and Bill Vlasic. "Detroit Chiefs Plead for Aid." The New York Times. 18 Nov. 2008. 
The spikes in CDS spreads for 5 year and 10 year protection contracts, as illustrated in Figure 4 
above, correspond to the news that surfaced about GM, as outlined above.  The CDS market 
quickly integrates this new information and can thus be used to ascertain credit risk.   
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, GM attempted to restructure its debt obligations.  In May 
2009, its debt holders held bonds with aggregate par value of $27 billion while, according to the 
DTCC, investors held $34 billion in credit default swaps on GM.  Hedge funds and other “CDS 
holders would make a net profit of $2.4 billion if GM were to default.”2  These profits that would 
have been foregone if a restructuring plan were agreed to, which complicated efforts to 
renegotiate GM’s debt.  This illustrates the empty creditor problem.  GM had liquidity reasons 
for trying to renegotiate its debt, which would have been the efficient step to take.  However, the 
empty creditors pursued an inefficient route by forcing GM to default.    
 The case of GM shows how CDS can have a negative impact on a company’s attempts to 
restructure and avoid bankruptcy.  By over-insuring, empty creditors have an incentive to drive a 
company to default.  This creates an inefficiency problem and downside to CDS.  Even though 
CDS can be vilified through the empty creditor problem, the fact still remains that this 
instruments has benefits.  CDS swiftly react to news and integrate new information into the 
market through changes in CDS spreads, which make them good indicators of the credit risk 
associated with a certain security.  Furthermore, investors with credit protection feel more 
confident in purchasing a company’s debt and can therefore assist in meeting its financing needs.   
V. Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations 
 Credit default swaps took on another dimension in their forming the foundation for 
synthetic collateralized debt obligations.  Synthetic collateralized debt obligations or 
                                                 
2 Sender, Henny. "Credit Insurance Hampers GM Restructuring." Financial Times [London] 11  
May 2009. ProQuest. 
collateralized synthetic obligations (CSOs) are a particular form of structured security.  A CSO is 
constructed by investing in credit default swaps referencing a portfolio of fixed income assets.  
During the recent crisis, this portfolio usually consisted of RMBS.  While the sponsor or arranger 
of the CSO may not actually own the referenced RMBS, CSOs enable investors to gain exposure 
to those securities.  Investors taking the long position in a CSO sell protection via the credit 
default swaps.  Those investors taking the short position in the CSO buy protection against the 
referenced portfolio of RMBS.  In exchange for protection against default in the underlying asset 
portfolio, the short-side investor would pay the long-side investor regular premium payments 
designed to match payments the long-side investor would receive from the underlying pool had 
he been holding a cash CDO.  A pictorial representation can be seen in the figure below.   
Figure 5: Diagram of Synthetic CDO 
 
 Source: Mengle, 2007 
 
An important difference between cash CDOs and CSOs is that the latter do not require an 
arranger to create subordinated tranches.  Synthetics can thus be customized to include only the 
highest rated super senior and senior tranches.  This customizability makes the asset attractive 
and its use greatly expanded in the run-up to the crisis. 
Table 4: Overall Volumes of Cash CDO Issuance 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 208 (thru 
September) 
Value of tranches issued (in 
billons of dollars) 
137 216 482 412 72 
Source: Asset-Backed Alert 
From the above table we can see how rapidly cash CDO issuance grew from $137 billion in 2004 
to $482 billion in 2006.  It began to dip in 2007, after the start of a tumultuous experience for the 
mortgage market and its deterioration.  By 2008, the value of outstanding CDOs was about half 
of what it had been four years earlier.   
 According to data from Creditflux and JP Morgan, the value of funded tranches of CSOs 
in 2004 was $260 billion dollars, which means that CSOs represented a major portion of the 
overall CDO market.  According to Dealogic, from 2005 to 2007, at least $108 billion in these 
securities was issued.  The actual volume was likely much higher because CSOs are customized 
trades and were largely unregulated and not reported to any financial exchange or market.3  It is 
clear then that CSOs significantly expanded the breadth of the structured security market.   
 Synthetic CDOs, just like the credit default swaps that they are constructed from, 
effectively allowed investors to bet on the performance of securities they did not own.  With 
standard, cash CDOs based on RMBS, the market is contained to the size of the subprime 
mortgage market.  With synthetics, however, parties can simply reference a pool of mortgages 
without actually owning them, thereby effectively increasing overall exposure to RMBS in the 
economy beyond the size of the subprime market.  Thus, the widespread use of synthetic CDOs 
expanded the market of structured securities derived from RMBS and exacerbated the subprime 
mortgage crisis.   
VI. Conclusion 
 Credit default swaps became prevalent and widely used instruments during the run-up to 
the recent financial crisis.  The growth of the CDS market in terms of notional value experienced 
an unprecedented increase between the years of 2001 and 2007, when it peaked.  The growing 
                                                 
3 Morgenson, Gretchen, and Louise Story. "Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won." The New York  
Times. 23 Dec. 2009. 
demand for CDS generated by investors and financial institutions contributed to the expansion of 
the market.  This demand also resulted in CDS contracts evolving and becoming more 
complicated, and the role of CDS evolving throughout the years before the onset of the crisis.  
CDS took on a multifaceted role.   
Although CDS is essentially a transfer of risk and in theory should not introduce 
additional risk into the economy, the above discussion shows that these contracts did in fact 
introduce perhaps unanticipated risk into the economy.  They were used not only to hedge 
investments but to also speculate as to the performance of certain securities, such as RMBS.  For 
investors to voice their opinions in terms of credit risk, they would oftentimes chose to take a 
position in CDS without a position in the security referenced for protection—naked positions.   
While CDS are useful in theory, their ubiquity can present a great deal of counterparty 
and even systemic risk.  This is what we saw in the case of AIG’s highly levered position in both 
subprime CDOs and CDS.  The threat of AIG not being able to post sufficient amounts of 
collateral posed counterparty risk in that the daisy chain might have collapsed.  The prospect of 
an AIG bankruptcy also presented systemic risk because it was America’s largest insurer.  
Furthermore, the tendency of investors to over-insure with CDS carries the risk of creating 
empty creditors, who can force companies to undergo inefficient bankruptcy when it would have 
been better for them to restructure their debt, as we saw in the case of GM.   
The fact remains that CDS markets do react quickly to emerging news.  This new 
information becomes integrated into the market via shifts in the CDS spreads and suggests that 
CDS markets are important in terms of gauging credit risk.  Creditors holding both CDS and debt 
may also have a socially positive role when they disincentivize corporations from trying to 
restructure for strategic reasons, a costly and inefficient process if done for a reason other than 
lack of sufficient liquidity to make the debtors whole.   
Overall, however, credit default swaps did add risk to the economy during the run-up to 
the financial crisis.  Aside from the counterparty and systemic risks and threat of an empty 
creditor problem, the growth in and importance of CSOs increased exposure to subprime 
mortgages.  Credit default swaps were used to make bets on the performance on subprime 
mortgages that the parties did not necessarily own.  This effectively expanded, albeit 
synthetically, the subprime market beyond the mortgages in the economy.  The result was that 
CDS and CSO actually exacerbated the financial crisis.   
This highlights the need for solutions that will help solve the problems with the way that 
credit default swaps have been utilized while allowing for investors to take advantage of their 
benefits.  Some steps have been made to convert CDS trading from OTC to an exchange.  This 
will help introduce more transparency into the market and offset possible counterparty risk by 
having a central clearinghouse as counterparty to all the parties.  Potential systemic risk can be 
addressed by requiring those entities considered “too big to fail” to not take on un-hedged 
positions in the CDS market and require them to post sufficient collateral to cover their positions.   
The empty creditor problem can be ameliorated if holders of both debt securities and 
CDS were required to disclose their investments during restructuring negotiations in order to 
make their incentives known.  Another possibility is to require approval from the debtor for the 
creditor to over-insure his debt holdings.  Finally, more transparency is needed in the CSO 
market.  The parties were often misled by the high ratings, which were not indicative of 
performance.  I think that if capital requirements were increased on CDS and CSO investments, 
they would become less attractive and experience smoother demand growth.   
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